By:
MAZHAR ILYAS NAGI
Advocate
LL.B.
Visiting Lecturer (Administrative Law),
Judicial review is the power exerted by the courts of a country to examine
the actions of the legislative, executive, and administrative arms of the
government and to ensure that such actions conform to the provisions of the
constitution. The institution of judicial review is predicted upon the
existence of a written constitution that is changeable only by some process of
legislation. Hallmark
of doctrine of Judicial Review is to keep the legislature as well as
functionaries of the State within ambit of their authority specified by the
Constitution. There is no cavil with the proposition that
legislative power to make laws is confined within the limits prescribed by the
Constitution. Any transgression beyond the limits prescribed by the
Constitution, being ultra vires of
the Constitution, can be struck down by superior courts and declared as
unconstitutional exercise of legislative powers. Judicial Review is a
constitutional practice rightly began from the assertion by John Marshall,
Chief Justice of the United States in Murbury V. Madison (February 24, 1803), a landmark U.S. Supreme Court decision which was the
first instance where an act of Congress was declared unconstitutional, thus
establishing the doctrine of Judicial Review.
In a recent case titled
Muhammad Mubeen-us Salam and others Vs. Federation of Pakistan reported in PLJ
2006 SC
History
of S.2-A, Service Tribunals Act, 1973:
Article 212 of the Constitution enables the appropriate Legislature to
provide by Act for the establishment of one or more Administrative Courts or
Tribunals to exercise exclusive jurisdiction in respect of matters relating to
the terms and conditions of persons who are or have been in the service of
Originally civil servants as defined in section 2(b) of the Civil
Servants (Act LXXI of 1973) could invoke the jurisdiction of Service Tribunal
by filing appeals. Amongst the pre-requisites of locus standi to file appeal before the Service Tribunal inter alia was that the person invoking
the jurisdiction of the Tribunal must fall within the definition of civil
servant. Officers/ employees in the service of statutory bodies, authorities,
corporations or organizations managed, controlled or run by the Federal
Government, being not civil servants, could not avail the remedy before the
Tribunal. Such employees could be divided into two categories namely:
(1) The employees in
the service of such bodies, corporations etc. where terms and conditions of
their service were governed by statutory rules; and
(2) The employees
belonging to such bodies, corporation etc. where no statutory rules were framed
to regulate the matters relating to terms and conditions of their service or
powers to frame rules/ regulations/ byelaws were not delegated by the
Legislature.
Employees, other than the persons covered by the definition of worker
or workman, belonging to the first category used to invoke the Constitutional
jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution. Violation
of any of the terms and conditions of their service, determined by statutory
rules, could be equated with violation of a provision of law warranting
pressing into service the Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court. The second
category of employees could further be divided into officers class/ supervisory
staff and the employees covered by the definition of “worker” or “workman” as
provided in the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, replaced by Industrial
Relations Ordinance, 2002, and Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing
Orders) Ordinance, 1968. The employees covered by the definition of “worker” or
“workman” used to approach the
Keeping in view the lack of remedy or multiplicity of fora for the
persons in the service of such statutory bodies, corporations etc., it was
decided to place all such employees/ persons on the same footing by providing
them a remedy of filing appeal before the Federal Service Tribunal for
rectification of the wrongs and redressal of grievances arising out of
violation of the terms and conditions of their service. For achieving the
desired objectives, the Legislature on
“Service under any authority,
corporation, body or organisation established by or under a Federal Law or
which is owned or controlled by the Federal Government or in which the Federal
Government has a controlling share or interest is hereby declared to be service
of Pakistan and every person holding a post under such authority, corporation,
body or organisation shall be deemed to be a Civil servant for the purpose of
this Act.”
Section 2-A, inserted in the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, by its own
force, created a class of Government servants by fiction, for the only purpose
of allowing them to avail remedy of appeal before the Service Tribunal. Perusal
of above section 2-A transpires that firstly service under such bodies,
corporations etc. was declared to be service of
Thus employees of such bodies, corporations etc. after incorporation of
section 2-A in the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 could no longer invoke the
Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 of the
Constitution, Civil Courts as well as of the Labour Courts. After insertion of
S.2-A all cases pending before all other courts stood abated in view of Article
212 (2) of the Constitution which provides that after establishment of the
Tribunal no other Court shall grant an injunction, make any order or entertain
any proceedings in respect of any matter to which the jurisdiction of such
Rationale
behind S.2-A, Service Tribunals Act, 1973 and its scope:
Intention of the Legislature appeared to be to provide
a forum to the employees of Corporations etc. against arbitrary removal,
discharge from service or other final orders that may be passed by such
Corporation etc. adversely affecting the terms and conditions of their service.[1] Main object of the declaration made under S.2-A of the
Act was to provide a remedy of appeal to the employees of the Banks and others
to safeguard their interests against the orders/ actions taken by their
Employer Corporations/ Private Companies regarding action taken beyond the
Rules/ Regulations/ Statutes.[2]
Ratio decidendi of the Judgment (PLJ 2006 SC 1296):
108. The
threadbare discussion on the subject persuades us to hold:--
(1) Section 2-A
of the STA, 1973 is, partially, ultra vires
of Articles 240 and 260 of the Constitution, to the extent of the category of
employees, whose terms and conditions of service have not been determined by
the Federal Legislature and by a deeming clause they cannot be treated civil
servants as defined under section 2(1)(b) of the CSA, 1973 and they are not
engaged in the affairs of the Federation.
(2) Section 2-A
of the STA, 1973 cannot be enforced in the absence of amendment in the
definition of the civil servant under section 2(1)(b) of the CSA, 1973.
(3) The cases
of employees under section 2-A, STA, 1973, who do not fall within the
definition of civil servant have no remedy before the Service Tribunal,
functioning under Article 212 of the Constitution and they would be free to
avail appropriate remedy.
109. Now
the question is as to what would be the effect of this judgment on the cases
pending before this Court and Federal Service Tribunal. in this behalf it may
be noted that following the rule of past and closed transaction, laid down in
the case of Mehram Ali v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1998 SC 1445), it is
directed as follows:---
(a) The cases
which have been decided finally by this Court in exercise of jurisdiction under
Article 212(3) of the Constitution shall not be opened and if any Review
Petition, Misc. Application or Contempt Application, filed against the judgment
is pending, it shall be heard independently and shall not be affected by the
ratio of this judgment.
(b) The proceedings instituted by an employer or by an
employer, pending before this Court, against the judgment of the Service
Tribunal, not covered by category (a) before this Court or the Service Tribunal
shall stand abated, leaving the parties to avail remedy prevailing prior to
promulgation of section 2-A of the STA, 1973.
(c) The cases
or proceedings which are not protected of covered by this judgment shall be
deemed to have abated and the aggrieved person may approach the competent
forums for redressal of their grievances within a period of 90 days and the bar
of limitation provided by the respective laws, shall not operate against them
till the expiry of stipulated period.
(d) The cases
in which the order of Service Tribunal has been implemented shall remain intact
for a period of 90 days or till the filing of appropriate proceedings,
whichever is earlier.
(e) The Service
Tribunal shall decide pending cases under section 2-A of the STA,
Logical
analysis of the findings of Supreme Court:
It is abundantly
clear from the above conclusion that:--
(1) Section 2-A
inserted in the STA, 1973 was couched in such a language that it could clearly
be divided into two parts namely (1) Service under any authority, corporation,
body or organisation established by or under a Federal Law or which is owned or
controlled by the Federal Government or in which the Federal Government has a
controlling share or interest was declared to be service of Pakistan and (2)
every person holding a post under such authority, corporation, body or
organisation was deemed to be a Civil servant for the purpose of Service
Tribunals Act.
(2) S.2-A has
neither been declared ultra vires in
toto nor the same has been struck off from the statute book. Rather it has been
declared partially ultra vires of
Articles 240 and 260 of the Constitution. The emphasis of the Supreme Court is
on the defect in legislation that persons in the service of such statutory
bodies, corporations etc. could not be deemed to be civil servant in the
absence of any corresponding amendment in the definition of ‘civil servant’
incorporated in Civil Servants Act, 1973. It can also safely be assumed that
the other part of the S.2-A, STA, 1973 i.e. ‘declaration of such employees in
the service of
(3) Article 212
(1) (a) provides for establishment of Tribunal to exercise exclusive
jurisdiction in respect of matters relating to the terms and conditions of
persons [3][who
are or have been] in the service of
(4) Under above
clauses (c) and (e) of paragraph 109 of the judgment, Service Tribunal was
under obligation to decide pending cases filed under section 2-A of the STA,
Interpretation
of the judgment by the Federal Service Tribunal:
Tribunal’s Notice
regarding the abatement of pending cases has given rise to questions of serious
consideration i.e. whether the Service Tribunal has rightly non-suited all the
litigant parties by an omnibus office Notice issued to parties without hearing
them; whether the judgment of Supreme Court, as a whole, has been read,
appreciated and given effect to and whether none of the cases filed under S.2-A
was protected or covered by the judgment of Supreme Court? Such questions could
only be determined if the parties would have been afforded with an opportunity
of arguments with regard to maintainability of their appeals. If the judgment
of Supreme Court is read as a whole, following additional points of vital
significance may be noted:--
(1) In
paragraph 68 of the judgment, Supreme Court has laid down two basic
propositions to ascertain as to whether a person is in the service of Pakistan;
namely (a) A declaration must exist that he shall be deemed to be in service of
Pakistan; and (b) Such person must hold a post or office in connection with the
affairs of the Federation or of a Province and includes in All Pakistan
Service.
(2) Again in
paragraph 74, of the judgment it has been held “It is equally important to
observe that under Article 260 of the Constitution, a person can be declared to
be in service of Pakistan if his duties have a nexus with the affairs of the
Federation, meaning thereby that a person who is playing an active role in the
performance of sovereign functions of the State and exercises public powers can
legitimately claim to be in the service of Pakistan. ………..”
(3) In
paragraph 82, it has again been held “the services of a person holding a post
in connection with affairs of the Federation can be declared to be service of
(4) In paragraph
85, it has also been held “………. Thus only those persons who are covered within
the definition of ‘service of
(5) In paragraph
86, it has been held “………………..… ……………….. Thus, the conclusion would be that
only those persons, who are in the service of
(6) It has
further been held in paragraph 89, “…………………… In order to make out a case for
the purpose of hearing before a Service Tribunal, a person falling within the
scope of Section 2-A of the STA, 1973, is required to hold a post, otherwise,
in absence of such mandatory condition, he would not be deemed to be in service
of Pakistan. Therefore the Service Tribunal would have no jurisdiction to grant
him relief.”
In view of the above
observations of Supreme Court, the Service Tribunal was obliged to ascertain as
to whether duties of any appellant before it had any nexus with the affairs of
the Federation or in other words he was holding a post in connection with the
affairs of the Federation or his terms and conditions of service were governed
by statutory rules, and if so, his appeal was maintainable or not? Mr. Raja
Muhammad Akram, learned ASC had also rightly argued before the Supreme Court
that “S.2-A of the STA, 1973 is intra
vires of the Constitution so far it deals with the persons, whose terms and
conditions have been laid down by statutory provisions and is ultra vires in respect of persons who do
not enjoy such status.” Mr. Raja Muhammad Bashir, learned ASC also argued that
“Section 2-A of the STA, 1973 can be saved by interpreting it in the manner
that so far it deals with the persons whose services are regulated by the
statutory provisions, they can be deemed to be civil servants, therefore, to their
extent it is valid law. Whereas in respect of others, whose terms and
conditions of service are not governed by a statutory provision, it is contrary
to the Constitution and deserves to be struck down partially.”
With due regard it is
submitted that view formed by the Tribunal fell short of being convincing and I
am unable to subscribe to the same that all appeals pending before it were
en-bloc liable to abatement. I am fortified in my view by the factual position
that there are numerous statutory bodies, corporations etc. which have framed
their own statutory rules. Employees of such bodies, corporations should have
been distinguished from those whose terms and conditions of service are not
protected by statutory rules. Mr. Iftikhar Gillani, learned Sr. ASC also
contended before the Supreme Court that “As per the will of the Legislature,
the employees of a Corporation have been declared to be holders of post in the
service of Pakistan, therefore, whether it is right or wrong decision of the
Legislature, the same has to be respected and it cannot be struck down for
reasons of jurisdiction, impropriety or expediency.” To establish such plea
that all cases pending before the Tribunal were not liable to abatement, an
illustration may be quoted in the following manner:-
Any person in the
service of State Bank of
(1) State Bank
of
(2) As provided
in S. 26 (1) of the Act of 1956, there are two main departments of the Bank namely
Issue Department and Banking Department. The appellant before Service Tribunal
was appointed and posted in the aforementioned Issue Department of the Bank.
Functions assigned to appellant and other officers of the said Issue Department
of the Bank inter alia were:-
(a) acceptance of moneys for account of the
Federal Government and Provincial Governments and making payments up to the
amount standing to the credit of their accounts respectively …….. etc. as
provided in S. 21 of the Act of 1956;
(b) issue of Bank Notes under S. 26 (1) of the
Act of 1956;
(c) reissue of Bank Notes under S. 28 of the Act
of 1956;
(d) supply of different forms of currency by
issue of rupee coin on demand in exchange for Bank Notes; Bank Notes on demand
in exchange for coin which is legal tender and supply of Bank Notes of one
denomination in exchange of Bank Notes of other denomination under S. 33 of the
Act of 1956;
(e) exchange of torn or mutilated notes with good
notes in accordance with the Notes Refund Regulations;
(f) maintenance and management of Cash Reserves
of Scheduled Banks under S. 36 of the Act of 1956; and
(g) issue, supply, sale and purchase of prize
bonds and other National Savings Instruments introduced under Public Debt Act,
1944 (XVIII of 1944).
(3) The
Legislature, under S.54 (2) (j) of the of the Act of 1956, delegated powers to
the Central Board of the Bank to make regulations consistent with the Act to
provide for the recruitment of officers and servants of the Bank including the
terms and conditions of their service, constitution of superannuation,
beneficial and other funds, with or without bank’s contribution, for the
officers and servants of the Bank; their welfare; providing amenities, medical
facilities, grant of loans and advances, their betterment and uplift.
(4) Terms and
conditions of service of employees/ officers of the Bank are inter alia governed by the State Bank of
Pakistan Staff Regulations, 1999, State Bank of Pakistan (Officers and
Executives) General Provident Fund Regulations, 1985 and State Bank of Pakistan
Officers (Pension-cum-Gratuity) Regulations, 1980 made by the Central Board of
the Bank in exercise of aforementioned powers conferred on it under section 54
(2) (j) of the Act of 1956. Safeguards provided in the Provident Funds Act,
1925 (XIX of 1925) have also been made applicable to the matters relating to
Provident Fund of the employees/ officers of the Bank under sub-section (2) of
section (8) read with entry No. 8 of the Schedule appended with the said Act of
1925. Under Regulation 37 (PART-IV) of the State Bank of Pakistan Staff
Regulations, 1999, the existing rules, regulations, orders and instructions
etc., are also applicable, until varied or changed by the authority empowered
to do so. To deal with the matters relating “Efficiency & Discipline”, a
detailed procedure has been laid down in the Booklet of Instructions made
applicable under above Regulations 37 (PART-IV) of the Regulations. By the
force of said saving/ adopting clause i.e. Regulation 37, Booklet of
Instructions is also to be read as part and parcel of the Regulations.
In view of above it
was required to be determined by the Service Tribunal before non-suiting the
appellant in the service of State Bank whether he qualified the conditions laid
down in the Supreme Court’s judgment and could legitimately invoke the
jurisdiction of Service Tribunal for the reasons:--
(a) A
declaration in the form of that part of S. 2-A of Service Tribunals Act, 1973,
whereby service under statutory bodies, corporations etc. were declared to be
service of Pakistan, is intact and has not been declared ultra vires of the Constitution.
(b) Such person
holds a post or office in connection with the affairs of the Federation or of a
Province and his duties have a nexus with the affairs of the Federation,
meaning thereby that he is playing an active role in the performance of
sovereign functions of the State and exercises public powers.
(c) His terms
and conditions of service are governed by the statutory Regulations made in
exercise of statutory powers contained in State Bank of Pakistan Act, 1956.
Matters relating to Provident Fund has directly been dealt with by the Federal
Legislature by promulgation of the Provident Funds Act, 1925 (XIX of 1925).
Provisions of
law identical to or in pari materia
with S.2-A not disturbed or declared ultra
vires of the Constitution:
Honourable Supreme
Court has not disturbed other identical provisions of law i.e. S.17(1-B) of
West Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority Act, 1958, inserted in the
Act by the Federal Ordinance LXXXIV of 1975 and S.3-E inserted in Sindh Service
Tribunal Act, 1973 vide Sindh Act XXXI of 1994. No finding has been given on
the vires of Removal from Service
(Special Powers) Ordinance, 2000 (Federal or Provincial). It may not be
impertinent to mention here that as provided in Section 11 of the said
Ordinance of 2000 “The provisions of this Ordinance shall have effect
notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in Civil Servants Act, 1973
(LXXI of 1973) and the rules made thereunder and any other law for the time
being in force.” Section 11 beginning with or prefixed by the word
‘notwithstanding’ is a ‘non-obstante
clause’. Marginal Heading of S.11 “Ordinance to override other laws” also
clearly indicates that the Ordinance stands on a higher pedestal and
applicability of Civil Servants Act and rules made thereunder or any other law
has been ousted. S.12 of the Ordinance also provides “All proceedings initiated
on the commencement of this Ordinance in respect of matters and persons in
service provided for in this Ordinance shall be governed by the provisions of
this Ordinance and rules made thereunder.”
“Ordinance was
co-existent with such other laws; meaning thereby that if the competent
Authority wanted to proceed against a person under the Ordinance; then
provisions to the contrary contained in such other laws, were to be ignored and
vice versa. Such was the clarification, which had been introduced by S.11 of
North-West Frontier Province Removal from Service (Special Powers) Ordinance,
2000 by using non-obstante clause
therein.”[4]
“In view of sections 11 and 12 of the Ordinance, the disciplinary proceedings
could not be conducted against the appellant under the E&D Rules, 1975.
………. The provisions of Punjab Removal from Service (Special Powers) Ordinance,
2000 shall have overriding effect.”[5]
“Disciplinary proceedings were not taken under the prevalent Removal from
Service (Special Powers) Ordinance, 2000, and had been wrongly/ illegally taken
under the Pakistan Steel Officer’s Service Rules and Regulations. Such
proceedings stood vitiated being null and void.”[6]
Section 10 of the
Ordinance of 2000 is again in the nature of non-obstante
clause and provides “Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for
the time being in force, any person aggrieved by any final order under section
9 may, within thirty days of the order, prefer an appeal to the Federal Service
Tribunal established under the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 (LXX of 1973)……”.
Proviso appended with S.10 of the Ordinance specifies its own period of
limitation which is quite different from preconditions and limitation laid down
in the proviso of S.4 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973. Section 10 of the
Ordinance provides a right of appeal before the Service Tribunal to the persons
in Government service as well as corporation service, independent of S.2-A or 4
of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 or any other law for the time being in
force. Now if any person in the corporation service, being aggrieved of any
penalty imposed upon him under the Ordinance of 2000, files appeal in the
Federal Service Tribunal, an anomalous question would arise with regard to
maintainability of such appeal in the presence of judgment of Supreme Court
declaring S.2-A as ultra vires of the
Constitution.
Mr. Wasim Sajjad,
learned Sr. ASC also stated before Supreme Court “If the Court has decided to
examine the vires of section 2-A of
the STA, 1973, it would also be required to take into consideration the
implications of the Removal from Service (Special Powers) Ordinance, 2000,
which covers both the categories of the employees i.e. civil servants and the
workers; and this Ordinance has got the Constitutional protection, in view of
the 17th Amendment in the Constitution.”
Similarly there is no
difference between the status of employees of WAPDA and many other statutory
bodies, Corporations etc. Both categories of employees are equally placed and
deserve equal treatment. It is yet to be seen as to whether employees of WAPDA
and corporations in the Province of Sindh are allowed to file appeals before
the respective Service Tribunal because S.17(1-B) of West Pakistan Water and
Power Development Authority Act, 1958 and S.3-E of Sindh Service Tribunal Act,
1973 are still in force and not disturbed by the Supreme Court. If the
employees of WAPDA and Sindh Corporations continue to enjoy the status of
‘deemed civil servants’, it would be another anomalous and discriminatory
situation resulting in miscarriage of justice. Reason found favour with the
Supreme Court in declaring S.2-A as ultra
vires of the Constitution is that the persons whose terms and conditions of
service have not been determined by the Federal Legislature cannot by a
deeming clause be treated civil servants. In the cases of WAPDA employees it is
also abundantly clear that all terms and conditions of service have not been
determined by the Federal Legislature itself. For example the matters relating
to ‘Efficiency & Discipline’ of WAPDA employees have not been dealt with in the Act of Parliament i.e. West Pakistan
Water and Power Development Authority Act, 1958 but to provide for such matters
Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority (Efficiency and Discipline)
Rules, 1978 were made by the WAPDA itself in exercise of powers conferred on it
by S. 18 of the Act of 1958. For the sake of convenience S.17(1-B) of the Act
of 1958 and S.3-E of Sindh Service Tribunals Act, 1973 are reproduced
hereinbelow which are also in the nature of ‘deeming clause’ couched in the
language almost in pari materia with
S.2-A, Service Tribunals Act (reproduced hereinabove):-
“[(1-B) Service under the authority is hereby declared
to be service of Pakistan and every person holding a post under the Authority,
not being a person who is on deputation to the Authority from any Province,
shall be deemed to be a civil servant for the purposes of the Service Tribunals
Act, 1973 (LXX of 1973).]”
[7][3-E. Employee of a Corporation to be
deemed Civil Servant. Notwithstanding anything contained
in any law, service of Corporation is hereby declared to the service of the
Province and every person holding a post in the Corporation, not being a person
who is on deputation to the Corporation shall, for the purposes of this Act, be
deemed to be a civil servant.]
Remedy available
to persons in the service of statutory bodies, corporations etc.:
There is no escape from the affects and repercussions
of the judgment passed by the Supreme Court, therefore, the immediate matter of
concern for employees of statutory bodies, corporations etc. would be the
remedy available to them. Employees covered by the definition of ‘workman’ have
alternate remedy of filing grievance petition before Labour Courts. Employees
adversely affected are those who are not covered by the definition of ‘workman’
i.e. officers and other supervisory staff whose terms and conditions of service
are not governed by statutory rules. Supreme Court in its judgment has left it
open for non-suited employees/ Appellants to avail remedy available to them
prior to
Supreme Court of Pakistan in various cases had held
that where the employment of a person was not governed by the statutory rules
of service, the principle of master and servant would become applicable.
Neither Constitutional petition nor suit challenging order of termination of
services could be maintained as a master was within his right to ask his
servant to quit. Suit for damages was held to be the only remedy for such
servant even if wrongfully dismissed from service. The view formed by superior
courts in this regard was “Undesirable servants could not be thrusted upon an
unwilling master.”[8] The
position, however, has undergone a radical change in view of pronouncement of
Supreme Court of Pakistan in Mrs. Anisa Rehman V P.I.A.C. and another (Civil Appeal No. 238-K of 1992), decided on
28-11-93, (1994 SCMR 2232). In that case it was held that if while passing an
order detriment to the interest of the employee the principles of natural
justice are violated, the employee can challenge that order by filing a
Constitutional petition. The reason prevailed with the Supreme Court for so
holding was that the natural justice being a part of every statute/ statutory
instrument, its violation would in law be violative of the statutory provisions
itself.
Whether black
notion of English common law ‘Master and Servant’ stands revived?
S. 2-A, Service
Tribunals Act, 1973 was in the nature of an inroad on the principle of master
and servant and declaring the same as ultra
vires of the Constitution has given rise to a question whether the weapon
of this English common law principle will be used by the employers with full
force against the persons in the service of statutory bodies, corporations etc.
to non-suit them by technical knock-out? As discussed hereinabove, persons in
the service of statutory bodies, corporations etc. are still enjoying the
status of being ‘in the service of
“General law of “master and
servant” has undergone radical changes mainly due to insertion of S. 2-A in
Service Tribunals Act, 1973. Employees of any corporation irrespective of the
fact whether it has got statutory rules or not can approach the Service
Tribunal for redressal of his grievances pursuant to the provisions as
contained in S. 2-A, Service Tribunals Act, 1973. Relationship of “master and
servant” does not confer unbridled or unfettered powers to act whimsically or
capriciously in violation of the principles of natural justice and well-settled
norms of justice.”[9] “Concept
of such relation did not enjoy Constitutional backing or any other law
including Islamic tenets. Principle of ‘Master and Servant’ being absolutely
below human dignity, would not be maintained.”[10]
“Law of master and servant, is a notion of English common law and does not
emanate from any Constitutional provision or even a statute or some injunctions
of Holy Qur’an or Sunnah of the Holy Prophet. Resort to rule of English common
law could not be taken effect in view of Art. 2-A of the Constitution.”[11]
“The resort to a rule of common law of English in preference to the one of
Pakistan Law or a rule of Islamic law or jurisprudence; or for that matter, the
Islamic Common Law, is not now possible under the Pakistan Constitution and
legal set up.”[12]
“Pleadings on the basis of “Master and Servant” relationship should be
discarded by litigants as said principle insulted the decency of human being.”[13]
In another case, contention of the Corporation was that services of the
employees were governed by the principle of Master and Servant, thus, Service
Tribunal had no jurisdiction to grant the relief of reinstatement, but in such
situation at the best, employees would have claimed damages. Supreme Court
repelled the contention while holding that it was wrong to contend that on the
theory of master and servant relationship, Service Tribunal had no jurisdiction
to re-instate an employee, whose services had been illegally terminated.”[14]
Mr. Muhammad Akram Sheikh, learned Sr. ASC also argued
before the Supreme Court that ultimate Constitutional objective is to establish
an egalitarian society, and if there was a sufficient public law element, then
the concept of master and servant will not be applicable. Mr. Abdul Mujeeb
Prizada, learned ASC also pointed out before the Court “The principle of master
and servant is violative of the Injunctions of Islam, Qur’an and Sunnah and the
Objectives Resolution. This principle is also violative of Article 14 of the
Constitution being against the dignity of person, security of life and property
of the individual employees, guaranteed under Article 9 of the Constitution.
This principle is also discriminatory and runs against the provisions of
Article 25 of the Constitution, therefore, section 2-A of STA, 1973 is to be
saved in the interest of justice.”
Efficacy
of Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court in juxtaposition with the powers
of Service Tribunal to examine questions of law and fact:
By incorporation of S. 2-A, Service Tribunals Act,
1973 the legislature had provided them an efficacious remedy of filing appeals
before the Tribunal. All questions of law and facts could be taken before
Service Tribunal.[15]
Such appeal would lie both on question of law and fact, which Tribunal would be
under legal obligation to decide.[16]
Supreme Court has gone to the extent of holding that “Even Constitutional
issues could be taken before Service Tribunal and dealt with in exercise of its
exclusive jurisdiction”[17];
“Civil servant cannot bypass Service Tribunal by adding ground of violation of
Fundamental Rights. Service Tribunal shall have jurisdiction in a case which is
founded on the terms and conditions of service, even if it involves a question
of Fundamental Rights”[18];
“Vires of rules should also be
challenged before the Service Tribunal”[19]
and “Orders, even if mala fide, ultra vies or coram non judice, fell within the ambit of Service Tribunal and
jurisdiction of Civil Courts including High Court was ipso facto ousted as a result of barring provisions of Article 212
of the Constitution.” [20]
Service Tribunal, being a Court of fact as well as law, is vested
with jurisdiction to take into consideration all the pros and cons
of the cases in minute details and, after application of judicial mind, may
pass appropriate orders. From the powers of the Tribunal it may
be observed that the scope of Service Tribunal’s jurisdiction in service
matters is much wider than that of the High Court. The exercise of power by the
Tribunal is not restricted to the striking down of only those actions which are
mala fide, without jurisdiction or coram non judice. In the Constitutional
jurisdiction of the High Court there always remains a danger of being knocked
out on some technical grounds. Theory of Master and Servant or non-statutory
rules usually come in the way of remedy sought by the employees of statutory
bodies, corporations etc. from the High Court. In constitutional/ writ
petitions arguments are to be confined to jurisdictional defects and the burden
of proving violation of any law or statutory rule is on the shoulder of
petitioner by pointing out legal infirmities from which the impugned
departmental orders suffer. Resolution of disputed questions of fact requiring
detailed inquiry can not be ventured upon in the Constitutional jurisdiction.
Service Tribunal is vested with vast power to enter
into the realm of facts and to consider violation of any rules, regulations and
even instructions or policies, irrespective of its statutory force. Under
section 5 (1) of Service Tribunals Act, 1973 the Tribunal has been empowered,
on appeal, to confirm, set aside, vary or modify the order appealed against.
The Tribunal in appropriate cases frequently exercise this discretionary power
and the punishments awarded by departmental authorities are either set aside or
some other minor penalty, commensurate with the gravity of charge, is imposed
on the appellant employee. Supreme Court does not normally interfere with such
exercise of discretion by the Tribunal, so long the order passed by the
Tribunal in appeal against the order of Departmental Authority shows
application of mind, the reasons given by the Tribunal satisfy the test of
reasonableness and does not suffer from arbitrariness. Supreme Court interferes
with the judgment of the Tribunal only when it finds that there were no valid
reasons for reduction of penalty and discretion was exercised by the Tribunal
on irrelevant consideration in an arbitrary manner, which the law does not
countenance and the same requires correction.
On the other hand,
the High Court, in its Constitutional jurisdiction, has no such power to
examine the gravity of charge and quantum of punishment for the purpose of
substitution of harsh punishment with that of a lenient one. Extraordinary
discretionary Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court is confined to
declaration of any order passed or proceedings taken as without lawful
authority and of no legal effect in exceptional cases where violation of any
provision of law, mala fides or want
of jurisdiction is shown on the face of record.
High Court would normally abstain to exercise such
jurisdiction and remain slow in interfacing in such factual controversy and
would exercise same reluctantly only in exceptional cases.[21]
Superior courts should not undertake to investigate questions of fact
necessitating taking of evidence, which can more appropriately be done in a
suit. Constitutional jurisdiction is intended primarily for providing an
expeditious remedy, where illegality of action of executive or other authority
can be established without elaborate inquiry into the complicated or disputed
fact. [22]
Some recent
cases involving interpretation of the Supreme Court’s judgment:
Disposal of
appeal by Service Tribunal by issuing notice of abatement through its
Registrar---- Validity.---- In a recent case, it was complained before Supreme
Court that the petitioner’s appeal was disposed by the Service Tribunal through
a notice issued by its Registrar without passing a judicial order. Learned
counsel for the respondent, when confronted with the argument put forward by
the petitioner’s counsel, contended that as appeals stood abated, therefore,
Chairman had passed a general order directing the Registrar to inform the
appellants accordingly. Therefore, petitioner’s appeal was disposed of
accordingly. Supreme Court declined to agree with the submissions of learned
counsel for the respondent because separate orders were required to be passed
in every case by the Service Tribunal after providing opportunity to the
parties keeping in view the observations made by Supreme Court in the judgment
relied upon. Held: The notice of information that
appeals have been abated could not be considered as judicial order. As such it
would be deemed that appeal of appellant is pending on the file of FST and is
required to be disposed of. Supreme converted the petition into appeal and
remanded the case to FST for disposal of appeal accordingly.[23]
Abatement of
pending proceedings---- Scope and extent.---- Law laid down
in the judgment of Supreme Court in Muhammad Mubeen-us-Salam and others v.
Federation of
In another case, however, High Court directed the
State Life Insurance Corporation to implement judgment of Service Tribunal
given in favour of employee against which petition was filed in the Supreme
Court. Order of the Tribunal was also suspended and it was alleged that at the
time of delivering judgment in the case of Muhammad Mubeen-ul-Islam and others V Federation of Pakistan PLD 2006 SC 602, no judgment in favour of employee held the field and
in view of paragraph 109(b) of this judgment, the claim of employee stood
abated. It was also alleged that employee could not claim any right unless he
resorted to the proper forum within 90 days and obtained relief therefrom.
Supreme Court held that the matter pending before this Court was the petition
of State Life Insurance and hence the cause that abated would be their petition
and not the appeal of the respondent, which stood already decided by the
Federal Service Tribunal, giving relief to the respondent (employee). Finally
it was held by the Supreme Court that the learned High Court has rightly
directed in the implementation of the judgment of Federal Service Tribunal. [25]
In a case an employee
of Zarai Taraqiati Bank was reinstated in service on the basis of judgment
passed by Service Tribunal. After pronouncement of judgment by Supreme Court in
case titled Muhammad Mubeen-ul-Islam and others V Federation of Pakistan PLD 2006 SC 602, authorities terminated the service of employee. Being
aggrieved of termination, employee filed Constitutional petition in the High
Court. Plea raised by petitioner was that since he had been reinstated in
service, therefore, his case was past and closed and transaction. High Court
declared the relevant office memorandum to be unlawful and set aside it. Held
that bona fide actions of public functionaries in ordinary discharge of their
duties were not struck down merely on the ground of subsequent findings as to
legal infirmity either in the appointment or with respect to powers of Tribunal
exercised in ordinary course of their business and declared otherwise in
subsequent findings. Doctrine of de facto was attracted in such cases. Being
past and closed transaction such cases would not fall within the ambit of
conditions set forth in the judgment relied upon by the authorities, as no case
was pending between the parties. [26]
Bank challenged the order of the High Court in the Supreme Court but petition
of the Bank was found to be without any merit and substance and the same was
dismissed. Supreme observed that the petitioner-Bank indeed had raised no
grievance against judgment of the Tribunal for a period of seven years. For all
intents and purposes, petitioners had accepted and acknowledged the finality of
the judgment passed by the Tribunal in favour of the respondent and, in law,
there was no legal or moral justification to reopen the case of respondent,
which had attained finality and was a past and closed transaction for all
purposes. [27]
Removal from
Service (Special Powers) Ordinance, 2000, S.10---- Right of appeal before
Service Tribunal---- Scope and conflicting judicial views.---- Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine that
what would be the effect of the judgment of this Court, dated
Supreme Court having declared S.2-A of Service
Tribunals Act, 1973 only partially and not wholly invalid, a distinction, must,
therefore, be made between corporation employees whose conditions of service
were regulated by Statute and those regulated by internal rules or individual
contract and the ouster of jurisdiction of Service Tribunal was applicable only
in respect of latter category/ regulated by internal rules or individual
contract. Corporation employees had not been declared to in service of
11. So far as the
appeal under Section 10 of the Removal from Service (Special Powers) Ordinance,
2000 is concerned, such appeals had also been filed by Appellants/ petitioners
in their capacity as civil servants under Section 2-A of the Service Tribunals
Act, 1973, but such position having been done away with, they cannot approach
the Service Tribunal for remedy as under Article 212 the Service Tribunal has
exclusive jurisdiction in respect of terms and conditions of civil servants
only as defined under Section 2(1)(b) of the Civil Servants Act, 1973. The
learned counsel for the respondents has rightly stated that the door of the
Tribunal closed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court under the constitutional
provisions of Articles 240 and 260, cannot be re-opened by a subordinate
legislation like Removal from Service (Special Powers) Ordinance, 2000. [30]
But in another recent
case where an employee of WAPDA was proceeded against under the provisions of
the said Ordinance of 2000, he, being aggrieved of final order passed under
section 9 ibid, filed constitutional
petition in the Lahore High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution, such
petition was held as not maintainable on the ground that petitioner could file
appeal before the Federal Service Tribunal. It was also held by the Court that
in such cases, dictum of Supreme Court in the case of Muhammad Mubeen-ul-Islam
and others V Federation of Pakistan
PLD 2006 SC 602 is not
attracted. [31]
In a case where an employee of the Board of Secondary
Education was retired under Removal from Service (Special Powers) Ordinance,
2000, his appeal was dismissed by the Service Tribunal on the ground
that under S.2(b) of the N.-W.F.P. Civil Servants Act, 1973 he being an
employee of the Board of Secondary Education, was not a civil servant.
Aggrieved employee filed petition for leave to appeal in the Supreme Court. Held.
Compulsory retirement was ordered under S.3 of N.-W.F.P. Removal from Service
(Special Powers) Ordinance, 2000 and S.10, thereof, dealing with appeals, had
categorically laid down that notwithstanding anything contained in any other
law for the time being in force, any person aggrieved by any final order shall
prefer appeal before the Service Tribunal established under N.-W.F.P. Service
Tribunals Act, 1974. N.-W.F.P. Removal from Service (Special Powers) Ordinance,
2000 being the latest special law had provided a forum of appeal to anyone who
was proceeded against under the said Ordinance. Appeal therefore, was competent
before the Service Tribunal which was wrongly dismissed by the Tribunal.
Petition for leave to appeal, after its conversion into appeal by the Supreme
Court, was accepted and the case was remanded to the Service Tribunal for
decision on merits. [32]
S. 2-A,
Service Tribunals Act, 1973---- Declaration as ultra vires of the
Constitution---- Dictum not applicable to cases in which services of employees
are governed by statutory rules.---- Case in which
the services of employees were governed by statutory rules were not hit by the
Supreme Court judgment in Muhammad Mubeen-us-Salam and others v. Federation
of Pakistan PLD 2006 SC 602. Supreme Court directed that cases of employees
whose services were not governed by statutory rules stood abated but other
cases would require further hearing on the question whether services of
employees in those cases were or were not governed by statutory rules and same
shall be fixed for disposal before appropriate bench. [33]
Service of
WAPDA declared to be service of Pakistan---- S. 17(1B), WAPDA Act, 1958 not
repugnant to Art. 260 of the Constitution.---- Provision of Section 17(1B) of the WAPDA Act, 1958,
declaring the services of the authority to be service of
Chief
Executive’s Order No. 6 of 2001 and vires of S.2-A, Service Tribunal Act,
1973---- Status of employees of P.I.A.C.---- 12. Reverting back to the status of the employees of
the PIAC and that of a civil servant under Chief Executive’s Order No. 6 of
2001 and the right of appeal of such civil servants before the Service
Tribunal, it will be advantageous to reproduce the relevant Article 4 of the
said order:-
Service under Corporation to be
service of Pakistan.---- Service under the corporation is hereby declared to be service
of Pakistan and every person holding a post under the Corporation, not being a
person who is on deputation to the Corporation, shall be deemed to be a Civil
servant for the purpose of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 (LXX of 1973). Any
person aggrieved by an order, made under Article 3 of this Order, may within
thirty days of the order, prefer appeal to the Service Tribunal established
under the said Act and the provisions of that Act shall, mutatis mutandis, apply.
A comparison of above Article 4 of the Chief Executive’s
Order No. 6 of 2001 with Section 2-A of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 shows
that the language of both of these are identical in all material particulars,
therefore, we agree with the learned counsel for the respondents that by necessary
implication, the status of the employees of the PIAC with their right of appeal
before the Service Tribunal has been rendered redundant. We are at a loss to
understand how Article 4 of the Chief Executive’s Order No. 6 of 2001 override
the judgment of the nine honourable Judges of the Supreme Court striking down
Section 2-A as being ultra vires of the Constitution. [35]
Vires of S.2-A, Service Tribunal Act,
Provisions of S.
13(3) of National Highway Act, 1991 showed that service under National Highway
Authority had been declared to be service of
Remedy available to corporation employees.---- . Irrespective of an employee of a State controlled
corporation, not being a civil servant corporations themselves would continue
to remain amenable to the jurisdiction of High Court under Art. 199 of the
Constitution. Rule of master and servant was inapplicable to cases where there
was violation of statutory provisions or of any other law. Expression
‘violation of law’ would not be confined to violation of any specific provision
of a statute, but expression ‘law’ ought to be considered in its generic sense
as connoting all that was treated as law in the country including even the
judicial principles laid down from time to time by the superior courts.
Accepted norms of legal process postulate a strict performance of all the
functions and duties laid down by law, and include the principles of natural
justice, public duty to act fairly and honestly and absence of mala fides in fact and law. Court, in
all such cases, would be competent to grant relief of reinstatement. All
petitions complaining of removal under the provisions of Removal from Service
(Special Powers) Ordinance, 2000 having been taken in exercise of statutory
powers, were maintainable and High Court would be competent to consider whether
action complained of was in accordance with provisions of Removal from Service
(Special Powers) Ordinance, 2000. Where violation of law was alleged, High
Court would be competent to entertain petitions and grant appropriate relief
within parameters of its jurisdiction under Art. 199 of the Constitution.
Where, however, grievance of petitioner was not founded upon any violation of
law, but merely upon violation of a condition contained in the contract of
employment, the rules of Master and Servant would apply and petitions would not
be entertainable. Since upon the pronouncement of judgment as to absence of
jurisdiction of Service Tribunal when petitioners had approached High Court for
hearing on the plea that no alternate remedy was available any more, such
petitions would be entertainable and dismissal of the earlier petitions, would
not be treated as res judicata. [38]
Consequently, such employees
including those employed by public sector banks, had no remedy available before
Service Tribunal, therefore, only forum available for plaintiff to agitate his
claim for compensation was the competent civil court. [39]
Appellant, in circumstances, could not be treated as a
civil servant under S.2-A of Service Tribunals Act, 1973 as his terms and
conditions were not determined by Federal legislation. Appeal was allowed and
impugned order and decree was set aside, with the result that suit filed by
appellant would be deemed to be pending before civil court, which would be
decided in accordance with law. [40]
Conclusion:
Whether
Service Tribunals Act, 1973, as a whole, is ultra
vires of Article 212 (1) (a) of the Constitution?
Article 212 (1) (a)
of the Constitution, under which the Tribunal has been established, speaks
about the terms and conditions of service of persons in the service of
Pakistan, and the Legislature has not used the term ‘civil
servant’ in this Article or elsewhere in the Constitution. On the other hand in
the Preamble of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 phrase ‘in respect of matters
relating to terms and conditions of service of civil servants” has been
used and S. 4 (1) of the Act also starts with the words “any civil servant
aggrieved by any order………” It is my humble view that the Legislature has
travelled beyond the mandate given by Article 212 (1) (a) of the Constitution
in promulgation of Service Tribunals Act, 1973 for establishing the Service
Tribunal for “civil servants’ only which term is alien to the Constitution.
Legislature was competent only to establish Administrative Tribunal to deal
with matters relating to terms and conditions of service of persons in the
service of
‘Service of Pakistan’ and ‘civil servants’----
Expressions not synonymous.---- We would like
to mention here that from the trend of arguments at the bar it appeared that
the two expressions ‘Service of Pakistan’ and ‘civil servants’ were treated as
synonymous. This in our opinion is not so. Service of Pakistan is defined in
Article 260 of the Constitution as meaning, any service, post or office in
connection with the affairs of Federation or a Province. This expression also
includes an All Pakistan Service and a service in the Armed Forces or any other
service declared under an Act of the Parliament or a Provincial Assembly as
Service of Pakistan. The term ‘civil servant’ is defined in Civil Servants Act,
1973 as a person, who is member of an All Pakistan Service or of a Civil
Service of the Federation or a person holding a civil post in connection with
the affairs of Federation, including a civil post connected with the defence.
…………. On a careful examination of the definitions of ‘service of Pakistan’ as
given in Article 260 of the Constitution and the ‘civil servant’ as mentioned in
the Civil Servants Act, 1973, it would appear that the two expressions are not
synonymous. The expression ‘Service of Pakistan’ used in Article 260 of the
Constitution has much wider connotation than the term ‘civil servant’ employed
in the Civil Servants Act. While ‘civil servant’ is included in the expression
‘Service of Pakistan’, the vice versa is not true.[41]
Post of an Ambassador is a post in connection with the
“affairs of the Federation”. Mere fact that a person was not a civil servant
within the meaning of Civil Servants Act would not put him beyond the pale of
definition of “service of
Obligations
of the Bar and Legislature under the changed circumstances:
Supreme Court’s larger bench has given its binding verdict which, in stricto senso, is unexceptionable but at
the same time it is also worth-consideration that Supreme Court has merely
pointed out some defects in the legislation of S.2-A. Now, therefore, it is
turn of the Bar to discharge its obligation to discover the ratio of the
judgment and also point out its social impacts. Mr. Abdul Hafeez Pirzada,
learned Sr. ASC rightly contended before the Supreme Court “This Court does not
act in vacuum. The Court has to take notice of conditions in which the society
is functioning. That is why it is said that no Constitution is rigid. While
dealing with the case, we have to look into the ever changing circumstances of
the society.” Mr. Wasim Sajjad, learned Sr. ASC also added “The Court while interpreting
the Constitutional provisions has to keep in mind the social set up of the
country.” Mr. Babar Awan, learned ASC referred to Article 37(d) of the
Constitution which provides for promotion of social justice and to ensure
inexpensive and expeditious justice to every citizen.
High echelons at the Bar are under obligation to endeavour for
persuading the legislators to cure the defects pointed out by the Court. As a
result of such legislative measures, right of filing appeal before Service
Tribunal, previously given to persons in the service of statutory bodies,
corporations etc., may be protected. Such legislative measures may save them
from the repercussions of black law of Master & Servant. Legislature seems
to be enthusiastically proactive to set right the controversial constitutional
provisions of political nature through “constitutional package” but nothing is
indicative from any quarter whatsoever as to whether social problems like
providing uniform judicial remedy to persons in the service of statutory
bodies, corporations etc. are under serious consideration at any end. Under the
circumstances the Legislature is under obligation to realize the social impacts
of the judgment and respond to the needs of time. Legislature through
appropriate legislative measures is expected to:--
(1) cure the legislative defects/ infirmities
pointed out by the Supreme Court in the language employed in S. 2-A, Service
Tribunals Act, 1973;
(2) bring appropriate amendments in Articles 212,
240 and 260 of the Constitution to include “service of a corporation or office
set up, owned or controlled by the Federal Government” in the “service of
Pakistan”; and
(3) incorporate necessary corresponding
amendments in S.2 (1) (b), Civil Servants Act, 1973 and S. 2-A, Service Tribunals
Act, 1973.
Lastly it may be pertinent to mention here that
Article 323-A of the Indian Constitution is a model provision showing the
consciousness of the Indian Legislators to meet the future needs of the
society. Said Article providing for establishment of Administrative Tribunals
reads as under:
“323-A. Administrative Tribunals: (1) Parliament may, by law,
provide for the adjudication or trial by Administrative Tribunals of disputes
and complaints with respect to recruitment and conditions of service of persons
appointed to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the
Union or of any State or any local or other authority within the territory
of India or under the control of the Government of India or of any Corporation
owned or controlled by the Government.” (emphasis supplied by me).
[1] Pakistan State Oil Co. Ltd. V Muhammad Tahir Khan and others, 2001 PLC (C.S.) 591 [S.C.] = PLD
2001 SC 980.
[2] Mahboob Hussain Qamar and others V United Bank Limited through President
and others, PLD 2001 SC 193.
[3] Inserted
and shall be deemed always to have been so inserted by the Constitution (First
Amendment) Act, 1974 (XXXIII of 1974), section 12 (w.e.f. 4th May,
1974).
[4] Rooh-ul-Amin V
[5] Muhammad Sajid Iftikhar Gujar V Chief Secretary, Government of the
Punjab, Lahore and another, PLJ 2006 Tr.C. (Services) 73
[P.S.T.] = 2006 PLC (C.S.) 396 [P.S.T.]. See also Muhammad Qayyum V Siddique Ahmed Nayyar, PLJ 2005 Tr.C. (Services) 349 = 2006 PLC (C.S.) 392 [F.S.T.] and Nisar
Ahmed Qureshi V Chairman, Pakistan
Steel, Bin Qasim, Karachi, PLJ 2005 Tr.C. (Services) 343.
[6] Nisar Ahmed Qureshi and others V Chairman, Pakistan Steel Bin Qasim,
[7] New sections 3-E and 3-F inserted by
Sindh Service Tribunals (Amendment) Act, 1994 [Act XXXI of 1994], Notification
No. PAS/ Legis. B-26/94, dated 16-1-1995, published in Gazette of Sindh,
Extraordinary, Part IV, 16th January, 1995, PLD 1996 Sindh Statutes 229.
[8] Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. and
another V Muhammad Shafi, 2002 PLC 124. Muhammad Umar Malik V Muslim Commercial Bank, 1995 SCMR 453 ref.
[9] Farasat Hussain and others V
Pakistan National Shipping Corporation through its Chairman and others, PLJ 2005 SC 212 = 2005 PLC (C.S.) 890 [S.C.].
[10] Saeed Khan Mobejo V Trading Corporation of Pakistan (PVT)
Limited through Chairman and others, 2005 PLC (C.S.) 1171 [F.S.T.].
[11] Muhammad Ashraf V Director-General,
[12] Muhammad Akram V Mst. Farman Bi, PLD 1990 SC 28.
[13] Ghulam Mustafa Khairati V
Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Islamabad and
another, 2005 PLC (C.S.) 417 [F.S.T.]. See also Saeed Khan Mobejo V Trading Corporation of Pakistan (PVT)
Limited through Chairman and others, 2005 PLC (C.S.) 1171 [F.S.T.].
[14] Abdul Hafeez Abbasi and others V Managing Director, Pakistan
International Airlines Corporation,
[15] Ejaz Rahim V. Federation of Pakistan, 1999 PLC (C.S.) 38 [
[16] Managing Director NBF,
[17] Sayed Sagheer Ahmed Naqvi V
[18] Munir Ahmed Sheikh V Federation of
[19] I.A. Sherwani and others V. Government of
[20] Khalid Mehmood Watto V Government of the
[21] Pervez Alam V
[22] Punjab Small Industries Corporation V Ahmad Akhtar Cheema, 2002 PLC (C.S.) 182 [S.C.] = 2002 SCMR 549.
[23] Raja Riaz V
[24] PLD 2007 SC 681 = 2007 PLC (C.S.) 1332
[S.C.].
[25] 2007 SCMR 1400 referred
in PLD 2007 SC 681 = 2007 PLC (C.S.) 1332 [S.C.] but declared as inconsistent with the
judgment of Supreme Court in Muhammad Mubeen-us-Salam and others V Federation of Pakistan through
Secretary, Ministry of Defence and others, PLD 2006 SC 602 = PLJ 2006 SC 1296 (Full Bench) whereby
S.2-A, Service Tribunals Act, 1973 declared as partially ultra vires of the
Constitution.
[26] 2007 PLC (C.S.) 663 [
[27] 2007 SCMR 1698 = PLJ 2007 SC 10.
[28] Umar Draz Khan V P.I.A. through Chairman and others, 2008 SCMR 420.
[29] 2007 PLC (C.S.) 1046 [
[30] PLJ 2007 Tr.C. 29 [F.S.T.].
[31] 2007 PLC (C..S) 1 [
[32] 2005 SCMR 1603.
[33] PLD 2007 SC 681 = 2007 PLC (C.S.)
1332 [S.C.].
[34] PLJ 2008
[35] PLJ 2007 Tr.C. 29 [F.S.T.].
[36] 2007 PLC (C.S.) 894 [F.S.T.].
[37] 1999 PLC 52.
[38] 2007 PLC (C.S.) 1046 [
[39] National Bank of
[40] 2007 PLC (C.S.) 1325 [
[41] Pakistan V. Wali Muhammad, Registrar, Supreme Court of
Pakistan V. Wali Muhammad, 1997 SCMR
141 = 1997 PLC (C.S.) 137 = NLR 1997 Service SC 45.
[42] Abida Hussain V. Tribunal for N.A. 69, Jhang PLD 1994 SC 60.