6. Terrorism.--(1) In this Act,
"terrorism" means the use or threat of action where,--
(a) the action falls with the meaning of
sub-section (2), and
(b) the use or threat is designed to coerce
and intimidate or overawe the Government or the public or a section of the
public or community or sect or create a sense of fear or insecurity in society;
or
(c) the use of threat is made for the
purpose of advancing a religious, sectarian or ethnic cause.
(2) An
"action" shall fall within the meaning of sub-section (1), if it:--
(a) involves the doing or anything that
cause death ;
(b) involves grievous violence against a
person or grievous bodily injury or harm to a person;
(c) involves grievous damage to property;
(d) involves the doing of anything that is
likely to cause death or endangers a person's life;
(e) involves kidnapping for ransom,
hostage-taking or hijacking ;
[(ee) involves use of
explosives by any device including bomb blast;]
(f) incites hatred and contempt on
religious, sectarian or ethnic basis to stir up violence or cause internal
disturbance;
(g) involves stoning, brick-batting or any
other form of mischief to spread panic;
(h) involves firing on religious
congregations, mosques, imambargahs churches, temples and all other places of
worship, or random firing to spread panic, or involves any forcible takeover of
mosques or other places of worship ;
(i) creates a serious risk to safety of the
public or a section of the public, or is designed to frighten the general
public and thereby prevent them from coming out and carrying on their lawful
trade and daily business, and disrupts civic life;
(j) involves the burning of vehicles or any
other serious form of arson;
(k) involves extortion of money (bhatta) or
property;
(l) is designed to seriously interfere with
or seriously disrupt a communications system or public utility service;
(m) involves serious coercion or intimidation
of a public servant in order to force him to discharge or to refrain from
discharging his lawful duties; or
(n) involves serious violence against a
member of the police force, armed forces, civil armed forces, or a public
servant.
(3) The use or threat or use of any action
falling within sub-section (2), which involves the use of fire-arms, explosives
or any other weapon, is terrorism, whether or not sub-section (1)(c) is
satisfied.
(4) In this section "action"
includes an act or a series of acts.
(5) In this Act, terrorism includes any act
done for the benefit of a prescribed organization.
(6) A person who commits an offence under
this section or any other provision of this Act, shall be guilty of an act of
terrorism.
(7) In this Act, a "terrorist"
means:--
(a) a person who has committed an offence of
terrorism under this Act, and is or has been concerned in the commission,
preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism;
(b) a person who is or has been, whether
before or after the coming into force of this Act, concerned in the commission,
preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism, shall also be included in the
meaning given in Clause (a) above."]
COMMENTARY
When the action of
accused results in striking terror or creating fear, panic, sensation,
helplessness and sense of insecurity among the people in a particular vicinity,
amounts to terror which falls within the ambit of Section 6 of the A.T.A.,
1997. PLD 2006 SC 109.
Striking of terror is
sine qua non for the application of the provisions as contained in S.6 of the
Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, which cannot be determined without examining the
nature, gravity and heinousness of the alleged offence, contents of the F.I.R.,
its cumulative effects on the society and a class of persons and the evidence
which has come on record. PLD 2006 SC 109.
A case of a public
servant assaulted by his private enemies for satisfaction of a private vendetta
and not with object of deterring him from his official duties does not attract
provisions of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 and such an assault upon a public
servant can be tried by a regular Court. PLJ 2003 Cr.C. (
Acts allegedly committed
by respondents had not been committed with any intention or mens rea specified
in provisions of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 and, thus, a Court constituted under
the Act no longer had any jurisdiction to try criminal case. PLJ 2003 Cr.C. (
Transfer of case from
Trial by
Prosecution had proved
the accusation by adducing confidence inspiring evidence. Victim had mentioned
in categoric manner that sodomy was committed by the accused and inspite of
victim having been subjected to an exhaustive cross-examination and various
searching questions, nothing beneficial to defence could be extracted.
Statement of victim had been corroborated by medical report wherein it was
opined in categoric terms that victim was subjected to sodomy. Complainant
(father of the victim) had furnished a plausible justification qua the minor
delay in lodging the F.I.R. Defence version put in juxtaposition with statement
of accused under S.342, Cr.P.C. was not convincing. Accused did not opt to get
his statement recorded on oath and no evidence whatsoever was led in defence.
Plea of innocence and denial simpliciter by accused could not be believed in
circumstances and High Court had appreciated the entire evidence strictly in
accordance with law and settled norms of justice and conclusion arrived at by
the High Court was based on sound reasoning which being well based did not
warrant interference by the Supreme Court. Petition for leave to appeal was
dismissed. PLD 2006 SC 524.
Accused, in confessional
statements had shown motive for causing murder which was sectarian killing.
Confessions were voluntary and true, which were sufficient to convict accused.
Three empty bullet shells were secured from the place of incident and other
offensive weapons were also recovered and were sent for examination and
Ballistic Expert Report was positive. Prosecution, had proved recoveries of
weapons used in murder of deceased. Prosecution, in circumstances had proved
case against accused persons beyond any reasonable doubt. Accused were dealt
with, as per law prevailing at the time of incident and were convicted and
sentenced accordingly. 2006 MLD 834.
Witnesses had
corroborated each other on material point and proved the factum of recovery.
Report of Expert with regard to Kalashnikov recovered from accused and empty
collected from the place of incident, was positive. Prosecution having
successfully proved case against accused beyond reasonable doubt, judgment of
Trial Court, whereby accused was convicted and sentenced, not suffering from
any misreading or non-reading of evidence, could not be interfered with. 2006
YLR 954.
Eye-witnesses including
the complainant had fully supported the prosecution case at the trial in
respect of charging "Bhatta" against the accused giving the same
details of the incident as disclosed in the FIR. Ocular testimony could not be
discredited in cross-examination. Accused had admitted his presence at the
scene of incident and the receipt of injuries by him at the hands of police
taking a different stand which stood falsified by the material available on
record. Trial Court had also believed the statements of eye-witnesses on the
point of charging "Bhatta", but had wrongly concluded that attempt of
charging "Bhatta" was not covered by Section 6(d) of Anti-Terrorism
Act, 1997. Offence of charging "Bhatta" as defined in Section 6(d) of
the said act was punishable under Section 7(iii) and a perusal of those
provisions together with Item Nos. (1) and (4) of the schedule of offences
appended to the said Act would show that the attempt of charging
"Bhatta" was a scheduled offence triable by the
Prosecution had not led
any evidence to show that the pistol secured from the possession of accused was
the same pistol which was used in the commission of the offence of
vehicle-snatching. Offence U/S 13-D of the Arms Ordinance, 1965, therefore,
was, not conjointly committed with the offence of vehicle snatching. Trial
conducted by
Condition precedent for
applicability of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 is that the offences mentioned in
sections 6, 7, and 8 of the Act. If sense of fear, insecurity in the people at
large or any section of the people or disturbance of harmony amongst different
sections of the people is created, said provisions will be attracted. Even if
by act of terrorism actual terror is not caused, yet, sub-section (b) of
Section 6 of the Act will be applicable if it was likely to do any harm
contemplated in, said sub-section. It is the cumulative effect of all the
attending circumstances which provide tangible guidelines to determine the
applicability or otherwise of sub-section (b) of Section 6. In the present case
about 300/400 people gathered at the house of the complainant and they would
have destroyed the house of the accused, if the police would not have
intervened. Lawyer community was also annoyed over the murder of a member of their
community and had passed a resolution in this regard. Under the circumstances,
the case was rightly assigned to
Schedule offence if
committed by a person having nexus with Section 6 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997,
would not be punishable with sentence other than sentence provided at time of
its commission. Accused of an offence having nexus with Section 6 of
Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, which was committed before promulgation of said Act
can be tried and charged by Special Court but would not be awarded punishment
other than one provided for such an offence at the time of its commission. PLJ
2001 Cr.C. (
While interpreting
provisions of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, same have to be construed strictly and
the benefit, if any, arising therefrom has to be extended to accused party. PLJ
2003
An offence which was
committed before promulgation of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, if included in
schedule would be triable by
Provisions of S. 6(b) of
Anti Terrorism Act, 1997 would indicate that such provision of law would be
adequately satisfied if same was likely to strike terror or sense of fear and
insecurity in people. Petitioner had killed his wife and four children in
brutal manner very object of the Act of 1996, was to Control Acts of Terrorism,
sectarian violence and other heinous offences and their speedy trial. To bring
any offence within ambit of the Act of 1997, it is essential to examine that
said offence should have nexus with object of the Act of 1997 and offences
covered by the same. Anti
Essential ingredients of
S. 6, sub-section (5) are (i) there should be prescribed organization within
the meaning of S. 11-B of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, (ii) there should be an
act and (iii) the act should be done with the intention or with its expected
natural and inevitable consequences of giving benefit to the prescribed
organization. PLD 2005 Kar. 344.
Injury sustained by
witness having been admitted, his presence at the spot during occurrence stood
established and his deposition about identification of respondent/ accused
could not be questioned. Non-appearing of another injured person in Court due
to his serious injuries and being in hospital and having died by the time when
judgment was announced, his non-production by prosecution could not be a
damaging factor to its case. PLJ 2003 Cr.C.(
Anti-Terrorism Court had
no jurisdiction to try without going into merits of case. Deceased was renowned person of area and was returning to
home after attending a funeral, where he was way laid and ambushed alongwith
two persons which sent a wave to terror in public and also sown seeds of tribal
feud. Alleged offence falls within ambit of S. 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act,
1997 and
Bare perusal of S. 6 of
Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 would indicate that offence which creates sense of
fear or insecurity in society, causes death or endangers any person's life,
involves firing on religious congregations, mosques imambargahs churches,
temples and all other places of worship or random firing to spread panic or
involves any forcible take-over of mosques or other places of worships, falls
within ambit of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. In present case though motive was
shown to be previous enmity, yet paramount consideration to be taken note of is
culminative fall out of occurrence which having taken place in Mosque, a public
place, during Jumma prayer, such fact was sufficient to attract provisions of
S. 6 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. Impugned order of High Court whereby case
against respondents was transferred to ordinary Court from trial Court was set
aside after converting petition for leave into appeal. Case was thus
transferred from ordinary Court to
Transfer of case from
While interpreting
provisions of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, same have to be construed strictly and
the benefit, if any, arising therefrom has to be extended to accused party. PLJ
2003
Word
"terrorism" has been defined in S. 6 of Anti-Terrorism Act 1997, to
be "serious" interference, "serious" disruption,
"serious"" coercion or intimidation or "serious"
violative against public servants. Word "serious" would imply
"dangerous to life or property". Fact emerging during investigation
would show that nothing has been done by accused party which could be termed as
dangerous to life or property. No case of terrorism on the part of accused was
made out. PLJ 2003
Transfer of criminal
case from
What constitutes a
Terrorist Act? To constitute terrorist act it is not necessary that commission
of murder must have created panic and terror among the people. Courts have only
to see whether terrorist act was such which would have tendency to create sense
of fear or insecurity in the minds of the people or any section of society.
Psychological impact created upon the minds of the people has to be kept in
view. It is not necessary that said act must have taken place within the view
of general public so as to bring the same within the encompass of the Act. Even
an act having taken place in a barbaric and gruesome manner, if it had created
fear and insecurity, would certainly come within the purview of Anti-Terrorism
Act. PLJ 2003 SC 506
Where alleged murder was
committed by respondent by sprinkling petrol on the person of deceased and he
also fired at him with Klashnikov and by such act body of deceased was
completely charred and even bones of his both hands and fore-arms were burnt,
death according to doctor had occurred apart from fire-arm injury due to
intense pain and difficulty in breathing in view of burning of large part of
his body, and the fact that such charred body was brought for its funeral rites
within the area of deceased's residence, it would have certainly caused shock,
fear and insecurity among people of the vicinity, on-lookers must have felt
fear and insecurity on seeing the barbaric and callous manner in which human
body was mutilated. PLJ 2003 SC 506
A case of a public
servant assaulted by his private enemies for satisfaction of a private vendetta
and not with object of deterring him from his official duties does not attract
provisions of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 and such an assault upon a public
servant can be tried by a regular Court. PLJ 2003 Cr.C. (
Motivation on part of
accused party in present case was a retaliation against the complainant party
and such motivation was based purely upon a personal and private grievance
which has no nexus with the objects of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. PLJ 2004 Cr.C.
(
Acts allegedly committed
by respondents had not been committed with any intention or mens rea specified
in provisions of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 and, thus, a Court constituted under
the Act no longer had any jurisdiction to try criminal case. PLJ 2003 Cr.C. (
Question of jurisdiction
of special Court. It was held by Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in cases of
Mehram Ali and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others (PLD 1998 SC 1445)
and Ch. Bashir Ahmad v. Naveed Iqbal and 7 others (PLJ 2001 SC 597) that an act
of private revenge based upon a personal vendetta is not to be treated as an
act of terrorism which is a species apart. In present case FIR itself mentions
that offences in questions had been committed by culprits in background of
personal enmity between parties and to achieve private revenge. Thus, a Court
constituted under Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 clearly lacks jurisdiction to try
Respondents. PLJ 2003 Cr.C. (
No motivation of accused
party in case. Conviction of accused party for an offence u/S. 6 of
Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 and for obtaining its punishment u/S. 7 thereof it had
to be established by the prospective that accused party had committed a
Terrorist Act, as defended in Section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. PLJ
2004 Cr.C. (
In general terms a
fright, dread or an apprehension in mind of a person induced by an horrible act
of a person or causing fear and terror to people is terrorism and if an act
done by a person which is a source of terror in any section of people which may
cause damage to life or property of an individual, is a terrorist act and is an
offence as defined in Section 6 of ATA 1997 and punishable under Section 7 of
the said Act. PLJ 2003 SC 147 = PLD 2003 S.C. 396.
Where a person had
committed offence before commencement of present Act which if committed after
date on which present Act comes into force would constitute terrorist act and
he would be tried under present Act but would be liable to punishment as
authorized by law at the time when offence was committed. PLJ 2002 SC 1048 =
PLD 2002 SC 841.
Even if there were just
few killings, random or targeted, resorted to with single mindedness of
purpose, nevertheless, impact of same may be to terrorise thousands of people
by creating panic or fear in their minds. PLJ 2002 SC 1048 = PLD 2002 SC 841.
Actions as enumerated
under sub-section (2) to S. 6 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 were offences under
Penal Code itself and such offences per se, were not triable by
A learned Advocate who
was in his robe and on his way to Court to conduct trial of a murder case was
murdered in a brutal and merciless manner and an Assistant sub-Inspector of
Police was injured within Court vicinity which resulted in terror, fear and
sensation. Impugned judgment is without any reasoning and Division Bench of the
High Court did not bother to have gone through relevant provisions of Anti-Terrorism
Act, 1997 and objects and reasons for its enactment. Besides that learned
Division Bench has not taken into consideration previous orders passed in this
regard by Lahore High Court Lahore for reasons best known to them. Petition
converted to that of appeal by granting leave and same was accepted and
impugned judgment is hereby was and case transferred to learned
Anti-Terrorism Court had
no jurisdiction to try without going into merits of case. Deceased was renowned person of area and was returning to
home after attending a funeral, where he was way laid and ambushed alongwith
two persons which sent a wave to terror in public and also sown seeds of tribal
feud. Alleged offence falls within ambit of S. 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act,
1997 and
Leave to appeal had
already been granted in another case wherein the question pertaining to the
jurisdiction of Special Judge under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, in terms of
S. 6(1)(b) or (c) was involved and in order to avoid conflicting judgments
leave to appeal was granted in the present case as well. PLD 2005 SC 530.
Cumulative fall out of
occurrence as to time, place and manner of offence and weapons used therein
falling under S. 6 of Anti-Terrorism Act 1997, created sense of fear and
insecurity in society. Case against accused persons was thus, triable by
In general terms a
fright, dread or an apprehension in mind of a person induced by an horrible act
of a person or causing fear and terror to people is terrorism and if an act
done by a person which is a source of terror in any section of people which may
cause damage to life or property of an individual, is a terrorist act and is an
offence as defined in Section 6 of ATA 1997 and punishable under Section 7 of
said Act. PLJ 2003 SC 147 = PLD 2003 SC 396.
High Court would be
wrong by withdrawing such case from
Where no witness
belonging to complainant party had uttered even a single word about any fear
and insecurity created in society at large on account of criminal activity of
accused party and the Investigating Officer, had stated before trial Court in
black and white that no evidence regarding fear and insecurity spreading in
locality due to action of accused had been produce before him. The High Court
held that motivation on part of accused party in present case was a retaliation
against the complainant party and such motivation was based purely upon a
personal and private grievance which has no nexus with the objects of
Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. PLJ 2004 Cr.C. (
Offence under Section
302 PPC and Sections 6/7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 are quite distinct and
separate from each other. PLJ 2004 Cr.C. (
Sprinkling of spirit on
person of victim was within boundary walls of appellants' house. It was not in
public and, therefore, element of striking terror or creating sense of fear and
insecurity in people, or any section of people is not made discernible in FIR
and for that matter on record of case as a whole. Similarly Schedule to Act
also indicates that element of striking terror or creation of sense of fear and
insecurity in people or any section of people by doing an act or thing by using
bombs, dynamite or other explosive or inflammable substances etc. is a sine qua
non for attraction of provisions of Section 6 and Schedule to Act. No doubt
offence committed was certainly most heinous in nature but it does not mean
that it does qualify to be a terrorist act within contemplation of Section 6 or
Schedule to Act. PLJ 2001 SC 597 = PLD 2001 SC 521.
here alleged murder was
committed by respondent by sprinkling petrol on the person of deceased and he
also fired at him with Klashinkov and by such act body of deceased was
completely charred and even bones of his both hands and fore-arms were burnt,
death according to doctor had occurred apart from fire-arm injury due to
intense pain and difficulty in breathing in view of burning of large part of
his body, and the fact that such charred body was brought for its funeral rites
within the area of deceased's residence, it would have certainly caused shock,
fear and insecurity among people of the vicinity, on lookers must have felt
fear and insecurity on seeing the barbaric and callous manner in which human
body was mutilated. PLJ 2003 SC 506 = PLD 2003 SC 224.
While bringing any
offence within ambit of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, Court must examine that
offence in-question, should have nexus with objects of the Act of 1997 and
offences covered by its Sections 6, 7 and 8. Bare perusal of S. 6 of Anti-Terrorism
Act, 1997 would indicate that offence which creates sense of fear or insecurity
in society, causes death or endangers any person's life, involves firing on
religious congregations, mosques imambargahs churches, temples and all other
places of worship or random firing to spread panic or involves any forcible
take-over of mosques or other places of worships, falls within ambit of
Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. In present case though motive was shown to be
previous enmity, yet paramount consideration to be taken note of is culminative
fall out of occurrence which having taken place in Mosque, a public place,
during Jumma prayer, such fact was sufficient to attract provisions of S. 6 of
Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. Impugned order of High Court whereby case against
respondents was transferred to ordinary Court from trial Court was set aside
after converting petition for leave into appeal. Case was thus transferred from
ordinary Court to Special Anti-Terrorism from trial in accordance with law. PLJ
2005 SC 36 = PLD 2004 SC 917.
For conviction of
accused party for an offence u/S. 6 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 and for
obtaining its punishment u/S 7 thereof it had to be established by the
prosecution that accused party had committed a Terrorist Act, as definded in
Section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. PLJ 2004 Cr.C. (
Occurrence had taken
place around District Courts. Firing at large scale. Victim belongs to legal
profession. Admittedly. Firing at such large scale have created insecurity and
panic in minds of people. Offence creates a sense of fear or insecurity in
society, causes death or endangers a person life, involves firing to spread
panic. Petition dismissed. PLJ 2005
High Court in exercise
of its writ jurisdiction ordering transfer of case to Sessions Judge. Supreme
Court finding that order of High Court was not speaking order but it was
perfunctory and appeared to have been passed in a cursory manner by ignoring
the objects and reasons for enactment of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. Supreme
Court set aside such perfunctory order of Division Bench of High Court and
re-transferred the case to
No question having been
put to him that he did not receive any injury would mean that injury received
by such witness was admitted. PLJ 2002 Cr.C. (
Offence under Section
302 PPC and Sections 6/7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 are quite distinct and
separate from each other. PLJ 2004 Cr.C. (
Injury sustained by witness
having been admitted, his presence at the spot during occurrence stood
established and his deposition about identification of respondent/accused could
not be questioned. Non-appearing of another injured person in Court due
to his serious injuries and being
in hospital and having died by the time when judgment was announced, his
non-production by prosecution could not be a damaging factor to its case. PLJ
2003 Cr.C. (
Offences committed by
accused clearly showed the motivation, object and design behind the occurrence
was to frighten and traumatize not only to complainant party but to whole
locality. Record of accused persons also showed that all members of the family
were involved in a number of criminal cases. Petition was dismissed. PLJ 2007
Cr.C. (
Anti-Terrorism Court in
such case would be right in rejecting application of accused under S. 23 of the
Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 seeking transfer of case to ordinary Criminal Court.
2005 Cr.LJ 624.