PLJ 2022 SC (Cr.C.) 112
[Appellate Jurisdiction]
Present:
Sardar Tariq Masood, Syed Mansoor Ali
Shah and Jamal Khan Mandokhail, JJ.
NADEEM
SAMSON--Appellant
versus
STATE
and others--Respondents
Crl. P.
No. 1016-L of 2021, decided on 6.1.2022.
(Against
the order dated 08.06.2021 passed by the Lahore High Court in Criminal
Miscellaneous No. 20944-B of 2021).
Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (V of 1898)--
----S. 497--Post arrest bail--Withdrawal of first bail--Second
bail petition--Fresh grounds--Withdrawal of earlier bail petition without any
arguments on the merits of the case, does not preclude filing of subsequent or
second bail petition for the same relief on same grounds. [P. ] A
PLD 2014 SC 241.
Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (V of 1898)--
----S. 497--Second Bail petition--Fresh ground as a matter of
right--Non-compliance of the direction to conclude the trial within the
specified period per se is not fresh ground for bail is correct--It is
certainly a fresh ground to be assessed and examined by the Court for
exercising of its discretion in either way, in the overall facts and
circumstances of the case. [P.
] B
PLD 2019 SC 112.
Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (V of 1898)--
----S. 497--3rd and 4th proviso of
Section 4097(1) of Cr.P.C--Object of--Bail grant for delay in conclusion of
trial--Scope of statutory ground of bail under 3rd
proviso--Statutory right of the accused to be release on
bail--Exceptions--Hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal, or is accused of
an act of terrorism punishable is death or imprisonment for life and if delay
is occasioned by an act of the accused or any other person on his behalf--Bail
allowed. [P. ] C
PLD 2022 SC 112.
Mr. Saif-ul-Malook, ASC for Petitioner.
Syed Nayab Hasan Gardezi, D.A.G. for State.
Date of hearing: 6.1.2022.
Order
Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, J.--The
petitioner seeks leave to appeal against the order dated 08.06.2021 passed by
the Lahore High Court, whereby the post-arrest bail, on the statutory ground of
delay of over two years in the conclusion of the trial since his detention, has
been denied to him in case FIR No. 123/2017 registered for offences punishable
under Sections 3, 4, 11, 13, 16 and 20 of the Prevention of Electronic Crimes
Act 2016. ("PECA") and Sections 295-A, 295-C, 298-A, 419, 420, 468,
471 and 109 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 ("P.P.C.").
2. The allegations against the
petitioner, briefly stated, are that he created a fake Facebook account in the
name of complainant (Respondent No. 3) and posted blasphemous material on the
said account. The case FIR No. 123/2017 was registered against him on
23.11.2017, and he was also arrested on the same date. Since that date, he is
detained and his trial has not yet been concluded.
3. As a background, the petitioner moved a post arrest bail
petition,[1]
among others, on the ground of statutorily delay under the 3rd proviso to
Section 497(1), Cr.P.C. on 27.02.2020, which was dismissed by the trial Court
on 10.06.2020. The petitioner approached the High Court praying for the same
relief; however, on the date of hearing, counsel for the petitioner, instead of
arguing the petition on merits, withdrew the petition praying for a direction
to the trial Court to conclude the trial within a period of three months, which
was accordingly passed by the High Court. The trial could not be concluded
within the direction period, and the petitioner once again approached the High
Court through a fresh bail petition[2]
mainly agitating the ground of statutory delay in conclusion of the trial. The
High Court dismissed the bail petition vide the impugned order dated
08.06.2021, by considering the conduct of the petitioner in the trial
proceedings during the direction period of three months. The High Court found
that it was the petitioner who had failed to cross-examine the prosecution
witnesses during the said period; therefore, the delay was attributable to him.
With this finding, the High Court denied the relief of post arrest bail to the
petitioner. Hence this petition.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the
first bail petition before the High Court had not been argued on merits and was
simply withdrawn availing the option of a direction to the trial Court for
expeditious conclusion of the trial within the specified period. Therefore, the
second bail petition was as good as the first bail petition and had to be heard
on merits. He argued that the petitioner was arrested on 24.11.2017 and the
first prosecution witness was recorded on 27.02.2020 after over a period of two
years and during that period, except the framing of the charge on 03.04.2018,
no proceedings took place; therefore, the right to be released on bail on the
basis of the lapse of the statutory period of two years from the date of
detention had accrued to the petitioner on 25.11.2019 and any conduct of the
petitioner after that date was not relevant. He
has, in this regard, relied upon the judgment of this Court passed in Shakeel
Shah v. State.[3]
5. Learned Deputy Attorney General,
appearing for the State, has submitted that after the dismissal of the first
bail petition with a direction to the trial Court for expeditious conclusion of
the trial, the second bail petition could have been filed by the petitioner
only on any fresh ground which was not available at the time of the first bail
petition, and that the statutory ground of delay in conclusion of the trial was
available to the petitioner at the time of the first bail petition, therefore
it was not a fresh ground for the second bail petition, nor could the
non-compliance with the said direction constitute a fresh ground for
maintaining a second bail petition. He has placed reliance upon the Talat
Ishaq case[4]
and Nazir Ahmed case,[5]
in support of his submissions.
6. We have considered the arguments of the parties, read the
cases cited by them and examined the record of the case.
7. There is no mention of arguments made by the counsel for the
petitioner in the order of the High Court whereby the first bail petition of
the petitioner had been dismissed as withdrawn with direction to the trial
Court for expeditious conclusion of the trial. As the presumption is always in favour
of the negative (semper praesumitur pro
negante), we are to assume, and proceed on that assumption, that arguments
had not been advanced by the counsel for the petitioner before the High Court
in that bail petition. Withdrawal of an earlier bail petition before addressing
any argument on the merits of the case, as held by this Court in the Nazir
Ahmed case, does not preclude filing of a subsequent bail petition for the
same relief on the same grounds before the same Court. Therefore, we see no bar
on the petitioner to agitate statutory ground of delay in conclusion of his
trial, which was available to him at the time of withdrawal of first bail
petition, before the High Court in the second bail petition. While the second
submission of the counsel for the State that the non-compliance of the
direction to conclude the trial within the specified period per se is not a fresh ground for bail is correct only to the
extent that an accused cannot, as held by this Court in the Talat Ishaq case,
claim bail on this ground as a matter of right, but it is certainly a fresh
ground to be assessed and examined by the Court for exercise of its discretion
in either way, in the overall facts and circumstances of the case. Before us,
however, the counsel for the petitioner has not pressed non-compliance of the
direction as a ground for grant of bail to the petitioner, he instead has
argued for right of the petitioner to be released on bail on the statutory
ground of delay within the scope of the 3rd proviso to Section 497(1), Cr.P.C.
8. The scope of the 3rd proviso to Section 497(1), Cr.P.C. has
recently been expounded by this Court in the Shakeel Shah case, cited by
the counsel for the petitioner, by examining and interpreting its provisions as
well as the provisions of the related 4th proviso, in detail. We, therefore,
think it unnecessary to re-examine the scope of those provisos again in this
case, especially when we find ourselves in agreement with what has been held in
that case. What we consider appropriate to do is to recapitulate the main
principles enunciated therein, as to the meaning, extent and scope of the 3rd
proviso, for clear understanding of, and compliance by, all the other Courts in
the country in terms of Article 189 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic
of Pakistan 1973. They are:--
(i) The
purpose and object of the 3rd proviso to Section 497(1), Cr.P.C. is to ensure
that the trial of an accused is conducted and concluded expeditiously, and that
the pre-conviction detention of an accused does not extend beyond the period of
two years in cases involving an offence punishable with death, or one year in
other cases;
(ii) The period of one year or two years, as the case may be, for
the conclusion of the trial begins from the date of the detention of the accused
in the case, not from the date when the charge is framed and trial commenced;
(iii) A statutory right to be released on bail accrues in favour of
the accused if his trial is not concluded within the specified period, i.e.,
exceeding one year or two years as the case may be, from the date of his
detention;
(iv) This statutory right of the accused to be released on bail is,
however, subject to two exceptions: one is embodied in the 3rd proviso itself
and the second is provided in the 4th proviso, which are:
(a) the
delay in conclusion of the trial is occasioned by an act or omission of the
accused or by any other person acting on his behalf, and
(b) the
accused is a convicted offender for an offence punishable with death or
imprisonment for life, or is in the opinion of the Court a hardened, desperate
or dangerous criminal, or is accused of an act of terrorism punishable with
death or imprisonment for life.
(v) The
act or omission on the part of the accused to delay the timely conclusion of
the trial must be the result of a visible concerted effort orchestrated by the
accused. Merely some adjournments sought by the counsel for the accused cannot
be counted as an act or omission on behalf of the accused to delay the
conclusion of the trial, unless the adjournments are sought without any
sufficient cause on crucial hearings, i.e., the hearings fixed for examination
or cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses, or the adjournments are
repetitive reflecting a design or pattern to consciously delay the conclusion
of the trial; and
(vi) The phrase "a hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal"
denotes an accused who is likely to seriously injure and hurt others without
caring for the consequences of his violent act and will pose a serious threat
to the society if set free on bail. Such tentative finding as to character of
the accused must be based upon careful examination of the facts and
circumstances of the case, supported by sufficient incriminating material.
In the light of the
above principles, we proceed to appreciate the statutory ground of delay in
conclusion of the trial pleaded by the counsel for the petitioner, for grant of
bail to the petitioner.
9. The petitioner was arrested and detained, in this case, on
24.11.2017. The charge against the petitioner was framed on 03.04.2018. Two
prosecution witnesses were recorded on 27.02.2020. Till that date, a continuous
period of exceeding two years since the detention of the petitioner in the case
had lapsed without conclusion of the trial; therefore, a right to be released
on bail had prima facie accrued to
the petitioner, which could have been denied to the petition only if his case
fell into any of the above-stated two exceptions: (a) if the delay in
conclusion of the trial had been occasioned by an act or omission of the
petitioner or by any other person acting on his behalf, and (b) if the
petitioner was found to be a convicted offender for an offence punishable with
death or imprisonment for life, or was in the opinion of the Court a hardened,
desperate or dangerous criminal, or was accused of an act of terrorism
punishable with death or imprisonment for life.
10. We have examined the record of the case and found that
there is no delay in conclusion of the trial till expiry of the two year period
of detention of the petitioner on 25.11.2019, which can be attributed to the
petitioner or to any person acting on his behalf reflecting a design or pattern
to consciously delay the conclusion of the trial. Any delay attributable to the
petitioner after the expiry of the said period is not relevant for determining
his right to be released on bail on the statutory ground provided in the 3rd
proviso to Section 497(1), Cr.P.C. Nor he appears, in the facts and
circumstances of the case, to be a hardened, desperate or dangerous
criminal" who is likely to seriously injure and hurt others without caring
for the consequences of his violent act and will thus pose a serious threat to
the society if set free on bail. The petitioner is, therefore, entitled to be
released on bail as a matter of right, not as a concession. The delay in
conclusion of the trial, noted by the High Court, attributable to the counsel
for the petitioner representing him before the trial Court, relates to the
period after expiry of the continuous two year period since detention of the
petitioner in the case; therefore, it could not have been considered by the
High Court for determining the right of the petitioner to be released on bail
under the 3rd proviso to Section 497(1), Cr.P.C.
11. The High Court has thus failed to correctly appreciate the
scope of the 3rd proviso to Section 497(1), Cr.P.C. This petition is,
therefore, converted into appeal and allowed: the impugned order is set aside,
the bail petition of the petitioner is accepted and he is admitted to
post-arrest bail subject to his furnishing bail bond in the sum of
Rs. 500,000/-with two sureties in the like amount to the satisfaction of the
trial Court.
(K.Q.B.) Bail granted
[1]. Criminal Miscellaneous No. 42206/B/2020.
[2]. Criminal Miscellaneous No. 20944/B/2020.
[3]. Criminal Petition No. 1072/2021 decided on
4.10.2021, available online at https://www.supreme Court.gov.pk/downloads_judgments/crl.p._1072_2021.pdf.
[4]. Talat Ishaq v. National Accountability
Bureau PLD 2019 SC 112.
[5]. Nazir Ahmed v. State PLD 2014 SC 241.